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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

Case No. 890273-CA

s

HARVEY DORTON,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from an order of the district court
denying his Motion to Set Aside Sentence, Judgment, and
Commitment and bases this appeal on Utah Code Ann. § 77-3526(2)(b) (Supp. 1989), which provides that an appeal may be taken
from an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the defendant, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (Supp.
1989), which provides that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.

The order was entered by the Honorable Leonard H.

Russon, Judge, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on October 3, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether this Court should entertain defendant's

appeal which is based on an untimely motion to set aside a
judgment?

2.

Whether defendant's convictions for aggravated

burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery are
appropriately based upon separate acts, or are barred because
they arose from a single criminal episode or are lesser-included
offenses of one another?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1978):
76-6-202. Burglary—
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or
any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling,
in which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978) (amended 1989):
76-6-203. Aggravated Burglary—
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated
burglary if in attempting, committing, or
fleeing from a burglary, the actor or another
participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any
person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use
of a dangerous or deadly weapon against
any person who is not a participant in the
crime; or
(c) Is armed with a deadly weapon or
possesses or attempts to use any explosive
or deadly weapon.
(2) Aggravated burglary is a felony of the
first degree.
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Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-301 (1978):
76-6-301. Robbery—
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or
immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished by means of force.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second
degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) (amended 1989):
76-6-302. Aggravated Robbery—
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife
or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-301 (1978) (amended 1983):
76-5-301. Kidnaping—
(1) A person commits kidnaping when he
intentionally or knowingly and without
authority of law and against the will of the
victim:
(a) Detains or restrains another for
any substantial period; or
(b) Detains or restrains another in
circumstances exposing him to risk of
serious bodily injury; or
(c) Holds another in involuntary
servitude; or

(d) Detains or restrains a minor
without consent of its parent or guardian.
(2) Kidnaping is a felony of the third
degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (1978) (amended 1983):
76-5-302. Aggravated kidnaping—
(1) A person commits aggravated kidnapping
when he intentionally or knowingly, by force,
threat or deceit, detains or restrains
another against his will with intent:
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or
as a shield or hostage, or to compel a
third person to engage in particular
conduct or to forbear from engaging in
particular conduct; or
(b) To facilitate the commission,
attempted commission, or flight after
commission or attempted commission of a
felony; or
(c) To inflict bodily injury on or to
terrorize the victim or another; or
(d) To interfere with the performance
of any governmental or political
function.
(2) A detention or moving is deemed to be
the result of force, threat, or deceit if the
victim is mentally imcompetent or younger
than sixteen years and the detention or
moving is accomplished without the effective
consent of the victim's custodial parent,
guardian, or person acting in loco parentis
to the victim.
(3) Aggravated kidnaping is a capital
felony unless the actor voluntarily releases
the victim alive and in a safe place before
trial, in which event aggravated kidnaping is
a felony of the first degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-402 (1978):
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of
single criminal episode—included offenses—
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a
single criminal action for all separate

offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a
defendant under a single criminal episode
shall establish offenses which may be
punished in different ways under different
provisions of the code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an
acquittal or conviction and sentence under
any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish
separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be
subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the
prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first
information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but
may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense
is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the
same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt,
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of
preparation to commit the offense charged
or an offense otherwise included therein;
or
(c) It is specifically designated by a
statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to
charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.

(5) If the district court on motion after
verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that
there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the
trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of the included
offense, the verdict or judgment of
conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the
included offense, without necessity of a new
trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Harvey Dorton, was originally charged with
attempted second degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated sexual assault.
After a preliminary hearing, the attempted murder charge against
him was dismissed.

The matter was tried before a jury on January

18 and 19, 1982, in Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, before the Honorable Bryant N. Croft, Judge.

The

aggravated sexual assault charge was dismissed on motion of the
defense at the close of the state's case.

The jury returned a

verdict of guilty of aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-203 (1978); aggravated robbery, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978) and aggravated kidnapping, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-302 (1978).

Defendant was

sentenced to three concurrent terms of five years to life.

He

appealed from the convictions and the judgment was affirmed.
State v. Dorton, No. 18667, slip op. (Utah Oct. 26, 1983).
Defendant was also convicted of bail jumping as a
result of his failure to appear for the second day of trial while

released on bail in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-312 (1978)
and was sentenced to up to five years in the Utah State Prison.
The conviction was appealed, and was affirmed in State v. Dorton,
696 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1985).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 23, 1980f at approximately 7:00 p.m., two
men wearing ski masks and armed with a sawed-off shotgun and
pistol entered the home of John and Betty Thomas in Murray, Utah,
without permission (R. 443, 491). The taller of the two men was
later identified as defendant (R. 462, 481, 502, 522-525, 533,
547-548).

The other was later identified at Ronald Leroy Hall.
At the time of the illegal entry, John and Betty were

not home; Garn Edwards, Betty's stepfather, was in the home
tending his two young grandsons, Johnny Thomas and Chancey
Pellum.

No one else was home.

Betty Thomas, Johnny's mother,

and Barbara Pellum, Chancey's mother, had gone out to do some
last-minute Christmas shopping.

(R. 442-489, 519, 527.)

The two men entered the house through the kitchen door,
confronted Mr. Edwards and the boys, and demanded to know if John
Thomas was home.

Mr. Edwards told them he was not.

they were there to get some money.

They said

To show that they were

serious, one of the men fired a shot and then defendant struck
Mr. Edwards on the side of the head with the pistol.
520.)

(R. 444-45,

Defendant compelled Mr. Edwards to go upstairs with him to

look for jewelry; they found none.

Defendant then took all the

money Mr. Edwards had on his person.

(R. 446-47.)

A few hours later, Betty Thomas returned home.

The two

men accosted her as she entered the house and demanded that she
give them her jewelry.
and bracelets.

She gave them two rings and some chains

(R. 450-51, 490, 499.)

Mrs. Thomas gave her son

Johnny some medicine for his strep throat; he was soon asleep.
The shorter man, Hall, accompanied Mrs. Thomas upstairs as she
went to prepare her little boy's bed.

(R. 452, 292, 493.)

In

the bedroom, Hall forced her to disrobe and lean over the end of
the bed.

He then forced Mrs. Thomas to engage in anal sodomy and

sexual intercourse.

(R. 494.) After Hall and Mrs. Thomas had

dressed and gone back downstairs, he took her alone into the
dining room where he forced her to engaged in oral sodomy and,
again, sexual intercourse.

(R. 495-496.)

At about 11 p.m., Barbara Pellum drove up to the house
(R. 454-496, 528-29).

She was accompanied in the car with her

children Kimberly and Kevin and her brother Grant Davis. Mrs.
Pellum went into the house to get her son Chancey to take him
home.

Defendant opened the door and was holding a sawed-off

shotgun.

(R. 454, 528-29.)

Mrs. Thomas, G a m Edwards, and

Chancey Pellum all had their hands tied (R. 452-453, 496). The
men threatened to kill all of them if they did not cooperate and
then told Mrs. Pellum that they had been paid $5,000 to kill John
Thomas.

(R. 530.)

Later, Mrs. Pellum overheard the two men

arguing between themselves, saying, "Let's just kill Betty.
will get $2,000 for killing her.
done and get out of here."

Let's kill her and get the job

(R. 530.)

During the time Mrs.

Pellum was in the house, the men fired several shots, one of
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which hit the television, shattering the tube.

(R. 455-56, 498,

529.)
Defendant demanded a cigarette.
had some in the car.

Mrs. Pellum said she

Defendant took her out to the car at

gunpoint to get the cigarettes.

(R. 454, 497, 530-31.)

When

they came back in the house with the cigarettes, Hall became
agitated because the people left in the car had been left
unguarded and might contact the police.

Defendant went out again

and brought Grant Davis and Kevin Taylor into the house. Mrs.
Pellum's daughter Kimberly had already left.

(R. 457, 497, 532.)

After taking Mr. Davis's money and money clip, the two men had
all of them lie down on floor and count to 100.
Hall then left.

Defendant and

(R. 458-59, 498, 533.)

Betty Thomas stated that the taller of the two men wore
an unusual spoon-type ring (R. 500-01).

Defendant was arrested

on January 2, 1981, wearing a spoon-type ring (R. 330, 518).
Mrs. Pellum saw defendant's face when he raised the ski mask to
smoke his cigarette (R. 533).
Defendant was tried by jury before the Honorable Bryant
H. Croft on January 18 and 19, 1982. He was present for the
first day of trial but failed to appear for the second day, and
the trial proceeded in this absence.

He was convicted of

aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated
kidnapping.

(R. 282, 312-25, 333.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The order denying defendant's untimely motion to set
aside the judgment was not an order affecting his substantial

rights; this Court may, therefore, wish to decline to review the
merits of this appeal.
Regardless, on the facts of this case, defendant's
convictions for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and
aggravated kidnapping were based on separate acts involving
multiple victims, and were not the result of one act during a
single criminal episode.

Further, the crimes charged are not

lesser-included offenses of one another.

Specifically,

aggravated kidnapping is not a lesser-included offense of
aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery is not a lesserincluded offense of aggravated kidnapping.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION, FROM WHICH THIS
APPEAL WAS TAKEN, WAS OUT OF TIME, THIS COURT
MAY WISH TO DECLINE REVIEW ON THE MERITS.
Defendant was convicted by a jury in January 1982, of
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated
kidnapping.

He appealed from his convictions, claiming he was

entitled to a new trial because of a defect in the information
and an error in a jury instruction.

The Supreme Court affirmed.

State v. Dorton, No. 18667, slip op. (Utah Oct. 26, 1983).1
Defendant did not claim at trial that his convictions were
inappropriate because they were committed during a single
criminal episode or because they were lesser included offenses of

Defendant was also convicted in a separate proceeding of bail
jumping in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-312 (1978); he
appealed and his conviction was affirmed at State v. Dorton, 686
P.2d 1218 (Utah 1985).
-10-

one another, and he did not raise the issue in his initial
appeal.
On July 11, 1988, defendant filed a pro se Motion to
Set Aside Sentence, Judgment and Commitment (R. 674). Lynn Brown
was appointed to represent him on August 24, 1988 (R. 690). The
State, represented by Ralph D. Crockett, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney, opposed the motion (R. 691). The motion was heard and
denied on September 26, 1988, by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon,
Judge (R. 714, 719). Defendant now appeals the denial of his
motion and claims that the trial court erred in denying his
motion because he could not be convicted of separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode or of multiple offenses
which are lesser included offenses of one another.
Defendant's jurisdictional bases in this Court is that
the order was a final order affecting his substantial rights
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(b).

The Utah appellate courts

have not defined what constitutes a final order affecting
substantial rights.

In Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah

1982), the court stated that the final judgment rule does not
preclude review of all postjudgment orders.

The order may be

reviewable depending upon its substance and effect.

While the

case was decided under former Utah R. Civ. P. 72(a), which has
been superseded by the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court and the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the court indicated that an
appellate court should look to the substance of a postjudgment
order to determine whether it is appealable.

While the Utah appellate courts have not decided what
constitutes a final order affecting the "substantial rights" of
an appellant under the new rules, it appears that in this case,
the order of the district court from which defendant appeals did
not affect his substantial rights.

The order denied a frivolous

motion, as set forth in point II.

Further, appellate review is

not appropriate for other reasons.

First, defendant waived his

claim by not timely preserving this issue for appeal in the trial
court.

Second, defendant has already had one direct appeal from

his convictions in which he should have, if the claims were not
waived, raised the issue he now raises.

Third, if the trial

court erred, and defendant has suffered a substantial denial of a
constitutional right, his remedy is not direct review but,
rather, a collateral proceeding under Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i), so
long as the claim has not been previously adjudged.
Other courts that have considered the issue of untimely
appellate review under similar circumstances have ruled that an
appellant in defendant's position is not entitled to a review of
the merits of his claim.

In People v. Cantrell, 170 Cal.App.2d

40, 16 Cal. Rptr. 905, (1961), cert, denied, 371 U.S. 853 (1962),
the defendant's direct appeal from his arson conviction was
dismissed for failure to timely file a brief.

Over six years

later, he filed a motion for modification of judgment; the motion
was denied and he appealed.

The court of appeals dismissed the

appeal, finding that the motion upon which it was based was
unauthorized.

The defendant's "substantial rights" were not

affected and the matters could have been reviewed on timely
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appeal.

To rule otherwise would have allowed the defendant two

appeals or could have the effect of indefinitely extending the
time in which to appeal.
In the present case, defendant's untimely motion,
couched as a motion to set aside sentence, judgment and
conviction, was not provided for by the Utah Rules of Criminal
2
Procedure.

It consequently should have been dismissed on

procedural grounds because it was out of time.

Regardless, it

does not appear to be an order affecting the substantial rights
of the defendant which would entitle him to appellate review.
For these reasons, this Court may wish to summarily affirm the
trial court's order without reaching the merits.
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S THREE CONVICTIONS WERE PROPER AND
ARE NOT BARRED BECAUSE THE ACTS OF DEFENDANT
OCCURRED DURING A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE OR
BECAUSE TWO CONVICTIONS ARE LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSES OF ONE CONVICTION.
Defendant contends that aggravated kidnapping is a
lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery since a person must
be detained or restrained to be robbed.

His contention that

aggravated kidnapping is a lesser-included offense of aggravated
robbery because detainment or restraint is inherent in a robbery
can be summarily disposed of.

In State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89

Rule 12 provides for various pretrial motions; motions related
to defects in the information, etc., must be made five days prior
to trial. A motion for arrest of judgment pursuant to Rule 23
(which provides for motions similar in substance to defendant's
motion in this case) must be made prior to imposition of
sentence. A motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 24 must be
made within ten days of imposition of sentence, unless otherwise
ordered prior to the expiration of the ten days.

(Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated that a literal application
of the kidnapping statute could transform virtually every robbery
into a kidnapping as well.

The Court held that to support a

kidnapping charge, the detention must be for a substantial period
and "requires a period of detention longer than the minimum
inherent in the commission of a rape or robbery."

Icl. at 93. If

the kidnapping is not "merely incidental or subsidiary to some
other crime," it is separately punishable for the kidnapping
itself,

^d.

In this case, the victims were detained over four

hours—certainly a substantial period and a period longer than
the amount of time inherently necessary to commit a robbery.
The second aspect of defendant's argument is likewise
without merit.

He contends that because aggravated burglary was

charged as requiring the state to prove that he entered a
dwelling with the intent to commit a "theft, assault or felony,"
and the facts here established that he entered with the intent to
commit a "felony," aggravated robbery is a lesser-included
offense of aggravated burglary.

Defendant's argument is not

supported by reference to specific facts or legal principles to
establish his position.

He correctly points out that to

determine whether a lesser-included offense situation exists, the
court must apply, under some circumstances, both a principle and
secondary test.

The principle test requires an analysis of the

statutory elements of each crime. An offense is a lesserincluded offense when it is established by proof of the same or
less than all of the facts required to establish the commission
of the offense charged.

The secondary test only becomes relevant

-14-

when a crime charged has multiple variations; that is, the test
must be applied to determine whether the greater-lesser
relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes
actually proved at trial.

For example, under some circumstances,

but not all, theft is a lesser-included offense of aggravated
robbery.

Specifically, aggravated robbery may be proved in any

one of three ways—when a weapon is used during an attempt to
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight
after the attempt or commission of the robbery.

When a weapon is

used during the actual commission of a robbery, theft is
necessarily a lesser-included offense.

However, it is not a

lesser-included offense of the other variations of aggravated
robbery.

State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983).
Applying the principle test articulated by the Supreme

Court in Hill— that is, comparing the elements of the crimes

to

determine if one is proved by proof of the same or less than all
of the facts required to establish the commission of the greater
offense charged—it is obvious that aggravated kidnapping is not
a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, and that
aggravated robbery is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated
burglary, as defendant contends.

The elements are, at a minimum,

not sufficiently similar or overlapping to bring the lesserincluded offense doctrine into consideration.

The secondary

aspect of the Hill test is, in this case, inaposite.

The statutory elements of aggravated burglary, aggravated
robbery, and aggravated kidnapping are set forth in this brief at
pages 2-4.

In State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1597 (1988), the defendant was convicted of
aggravated robbery of the store clerk, theft, and aggravated
assault of a person who interrupted the robbery.

He argued on

appeal that the aggravated assault and theft were lesser-included
offenses of the aggravated robbery.

The Supreme Court summarily

rejected his argument that the aggravated assault was a lesserincluded offense of the aggravated robbery, stating that the
aggravated robbery and aggravated assault were simply two
offenses committed within the same criminal episode and the
4
crimes required proof by different evidence.
I^d* a t H 9 1 .
Finally, defendant's convictions are not precluded by
the concept that they were committed during a single criminal
episode.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) provides:
A defendant may be prosecuted in a single
criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of
this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other
such provision.

(Emphasis added.)
Defendant's three convictions are not barred by this
provision because his convictions were not the result of the
"same act" punished in more than one way, but were rather

4
Applying the secondary aspect of the Hill analysis, the Court
found that theft was a lesser-included offense of aggravated
robbery on the facts of case.
- i fi-

separate and distinct acts.

Branch, 743 P.2d at 1191.

Defendant

and co-defendant Hall forced their way into the home of Betty and
John Thomas while armed with a pistol and a sawed-off shotgun;
their expressed intent was to murder John Thomas.

During the

course of the next four hours, defendant and Hall beat Betty's
stepfather over the head with a gun, and defendant forcibly took
the stepfather's money.

When Betty got home, she was beaten,

raped and sodomized by Hall.
and money from her purse.
seven people captive.

She was also robbed of her jewelry

In the end, defendant and Hall held

This, alone, was sufficient to result in

seven counts of aggravated kidnapping.

In State v. James, 631

P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1981), the Supreme Court stated that "[i]n
crimes against the person . . . a single criminal act or episode
may constitute as many offenses as there are victims."

In James,

the defendant was convicted of five counts of kidnapping, one
count for each victim; the court found the convictions to be
appropriate and looked to the statute, which speaks in terms of
the singular victim.

See also State v. Eichler, 584 P.2d 861

(Utah 1978) (aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping
convictions which arise from the same criminal episode were not
barred as they were not the same act of the defendant).
If this Court reaches the merits of defendant's claims,
it is clear that defendant was not "over-charged" or "overconvicted. "

If anything, his multiple acts against multiple

victims could and should have resulted in additional charges and
convictions.

Defendant's crimes, although committed during one

four-hour criminal episode, were separate acts done as the result
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of intentional conduct.

An examination of the elements of the

crimes establish that aggravated kidnapping is not a lesserincluded offense of aggravated robbery, and that aggravated
robbery is not a lesser-included offense of aggravated burglary.
His convictions, therefore, are not barred because they were a
single act during a single criminal episode or because they are
lesser-included offenses of one another.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Harvey Dorton, was properly convicted of
aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and aggravated
kidnapping.

For the foregoing reasons, and any additional

reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of Utah respectfully
requests that this Court affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

day of August, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General

BARA BEA^SON
sistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Lynn R. Brown, attorney for defendant, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on t h i s ^ Q ^ a y of
August, 1989.

^ A

-18-

